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The Working Papers series
The Schuman Centre’s Programme in Economic Policy provides a framework 
for the presentation and development of ideas and research that can constitute 
the basis for informed policy-making in any area to which economic reasoning 
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The unemployment picture in Europe is bleak.* Two issues arise. First, the 
unemployment rate has moved up from 2.6 percent in 1970 to nearly 11 percent 
in 1996 in the European OECD countries, ratcheting upward in the seventies and 
the early eighties and moving upward again in the mid nineties. The share of long­
term unemployed in total unemployed persons has increased considerably; the 
long-term unemployment rate has gone up from 0.9 (1979) to 6.6 percent (1994). 
Why has this development occurred? What has changed in Europe in the last 
twenty-five years?
Second, the experience in the European labor market contrasts markedly to that 
of the United States. Whereas employment in the private sector of the U.S. 
increased by 60 per cent (44 million additional jobs) during the period from 1970 
to 1994, Europe only added 10 percent (20 million jobs, with employment in 
1970 nearly double to that of the US; see Figure 1). Unlike in Europe, there was 
no sustained increase in the unemployment rate. The share of long-term 
unemployment in total unemployment is much lower. The question is why the 
European experience has been so markedly different from that of the U.S..
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Unemployment is, of course, a complex phenomenon due to many factors. But 
one answer to the above two questions is that institutional characteristics are at 
the root of the generally poor labor market performance in Europe. More 
specifically, institutional changes in the labor market in Europe over the last 
twenty-five years can be considered to be one of the factors responsible for the 
increase in unemployment. Moreover, institutional differences to the United 
States can explain the different picture between Europe and the U.S.
The labor market can be understood to be a very complex institutional mechanism 
having the function to bring about a satisfactory employment situation in an 
economy (Figure 2). In any economy there is an array of institutional 
arrangements that forms a complex web of incentives and disincentives all 
affecting the processes in the labor market. These arrangements relate to formal 
or traditional rules of behavior, for instance, in the wage negotiations between 
trade unions and employer associations, to procedures established by voluntary 
contractual arrangements, to legal norms for wage setting, including constitutional 
rights, for instance, the right to bargain collectively (“Tarifautonomie”) in 
Germany, to specific labor market regulations relating to working time or other 
matters, to governmental unemployment schemes, to rules for retirement and old- 
age insurance, to social welfare payments, to education and training, to taxation, 
to supply side policies, and to demand management. In Figure 2, four different 
institutional layers affecting the labor market in Europe are distinguished: the 
market process, the rules affecting the wage formation process, the legal system, 
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Starting front a simple notion of an equilibrium in a classically clearing labor 
market, institutional arrangements can influence the clearing function of the labor 
market in basically three ways, (i) They can weaken the demand for labor, 
making it less attractive to hire a worker by explicitly pushing up the wage costs 
or by introducing a negative shadow price for labor, (ii) They can distort the labor 
supply, (iii) They can impair the equilibrating function of the market mechanism, 
for instance, by influencing bargaining behavior. Of course, all these effects are 
interrelated.
It should be quite clear that it is not very promising to look at a single institutional 
characteristics only and analyze its expected and, where possible, its empirically 
established impact on employment and unemployment. The effect of a single 
institutional arrangement can only be understood in its specific interaction with 
other institutional rules. A regulation making it difficult to lay off people will bite 
more, if a firm in crisis cannot adjust wages and working time downward. 
Consequently, it is the cumulative effect of rules that is relevant for the total 
impact (Lindbeck 1996).
2. Major Institutional Changes in Europe
When looking at Europe’s experience with unemployment since 1970, a possible 
explanation is that the economic environment has changed. In some countries 
such as Germany the catching-up process after the war came more or less to an 
end in the seventies; labor productivity only increased by less than 2 percent in 
OECD Europe in the eighties and nineties instead of by the 5 percent that it had 
increased in the sixties and early seventies (OECD 1996a, Table 59). Moreover, 
because of the oil shock, Europe experienced a change in its exogenous data, 
representing a marked difference to the sixties. However, it does not appear as if 
Europe has experienced exogenous changes — oil shock, technological change or 
increased trade from developing countries — notably different from those 
experienced in the U.S. After the catching-up process has ended in Europe in the 
early seventies, the increase in labor productivity does not seem to be basically 
different in Europe than in the U.S. if one takes into account that Europe’s labor 
productivity has increased at least partly as a result of layoffs. Consequently, it 
seems justified to concentrate on the institutional setting in Europe.
The most important aspect of the European unemployment puzzle is that Europe 
has seen major changes in the institutional characteristics of its labor markets, 
especially in the late sixties and in the seventies. In these two decades, equity 
considerations gained prominence (Table 1). This related to the shaping of legal 




























































































insurance schemes, including old-age pensions. Although the institutional 
characteristics of the wage setting process did not change in a narrow 
interpretation, other elements of the institutional setting did vary considerably: the 
tax wedge widened, since more generous social insurance benefits had to be 
financed from labor productivity. To some extent, new working-time rules 
negatively affected the increase in labor productivity. Layoff restraints were made 
more strict and severance pay in the case of closings were increased, both 
explicitly by law and by the judicial system. Most importantly, the reservation 
wage was raised by a whole set of measures: the duration of benefits was partly 
increased; it was made easier to obtain unemployment benefits; the conditions 
under which unemployed were expected to accept jobs were interpreted more 
generously (“reasonableness” or “Zumutbarkeit”); governmental schemes for the 
unemployed were extended; the relative distance between the lowest wage in the 
labor market and nonworking income in welfare programs became more narrow; 
and the minimum wage, which is applied in some countries, was raised. All these 




























































































Table 1 — Major Institutional Changes Affecting the Labor Market, Selected 
European Countries
France
1968 Increase in the minimum wage.
1974 Increase in the minimum wage.
1979 Increase in unemployment benefits, extension of temporary contracts.
1981 Increase in the minimum wage.
1982 Restriction of temporary contracts to only temporary work in nature.
1983 Exceptional authorization to recruit unemployed workers with temporary 
contracts.
1985 Extension of temporary contracts: can apply to the unemployed.
1986 Extension of temporary contracts up to 24 months, suppression of adminis­
trative authorization.
1989 Introduction of guaranteed income benefits, increase in firing costs, new 
restrictions for temporary contracts: back to 12 months; limited to replace­
ment.
Germany
1968-1973 ..Harmonized Action" (Konzertierte Aktion) between trade unions, employers 
associations, and government: Coordination of fiscal, social and income 
policies.
1969 Wage payment of 100 percent for six weeks in the case of illness (applicable 
to clerks) extended to workers.
1972 Mandatory social plan in the case of closings of firms (Betriebsverfassungs- 
gesetz, Firm Constitution Law).
1970-1975 Continuous increase in the share of social insurance payments (Soziallei- 
stungsquote) from 13 to 18 percent of GDP (Sachverstàndigenrat 1994/95, 
Figure 36); increase in contributions, increase of the income threshold that 
determines forced membership of the social insurance system.
1975 Change in unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld  from 63 to 68 percent of 
net earnings, A rbeitslosenhilfe  from 53 to 58 percent; Arbeitsforderungsge- 






























































































1976 Codetermination law: half of the members of the supervisory board of big 
firms have to be representatives of the workers.
1977 Social package; some reductions in payments of old age and health insurance. 
Reduction of minimum reserves for the old age insurance.
1982 Unemployment benefits slightly reduced. A rbeitslosengeld  from 68 to 63 
percent for unemployed without children. Arbeitslosenhilfe  from 58 to 56 
percent for unemployed without children. Overtime payments no longer taken 
into account.
1985 Regulation of social closing plans (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). Maternal 
leave for up to 3 years with job guaranteed by firms. Maternal leave pay by 
government. Employment Promotion Act: Temporary work contracts up to 
18 months introduced.
1986 No unemployment benefits for workers temporarily underemployed due to 
strike in the same industry (§116 Arbeitsforderungsgesetz).
1989/92/96 Caps for the increase in social health costs.
1992 Old age pensions linked to the increase in net wages instead of gross wages.
1994 Reduction of unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld  from 63 (unemployed 
with no children)/68 to 60/67 percent, A rbeitslosenhilfe  from 56/58 to 53/57 
percent.
1996 Temporary work contracts are made somewhat easier by law. Loosening of 
layoff restraints for firms with less than 10 employees.
Italy
1962 Restrictions on temporary labor contracts.
1966 Regulation of firing procedures.
1970 Introduction of (practically infinite) firing costs, following wave of strikes.
1977 Temporary work contracts authorized in tourism and trade.
1984 Authorization of young people to recruit with temporary work contracts.
1986 Authorization of layoff for economic reasons.





























































































1989 Extension to small firms of job protection against disciplinary redundancies.
1990 Extension of unfair dismissal legislation to smaller firms.
1991 Easing of firing restrictions for large firms.
1992 Discontinuation of the scala mobile.
Ending of synchronized wage bargaining across sectors.
Netherlands
1963 Introduction of guaranteed income benefits. Continuous expansion of the 
social security system in the sixties.
1976 Advance notice law for firings.
1985-87 Reduction of the replacement rates for unemployment, sickness and disability 
from 80 to 70 percent.
1987 Stronger entry conditions for disability insurance.
1993 More restrictive definition of disability.
1994 Employers are made directly liable for wages of sick employees in the first six 
weeks, employer contributions related to the sickness record of the firm.
1995 Discontinuation of the Social Insurance Council, establishment of the Com­
mission for Supervising Social Insurance.
United Kingdom
1965 Redundancy payment act.
1971 Unfair dismissal law.
1975 Equal pay and sex discrimination acts came into force.
1978 Employment protection consolidation act.
1979 Statutory redundancy consultation period reduced.
1979 Increase in the employment duration required to benefit from unfair dismissals 
protection (1 year instead of 6 months).
1980 Employment Act of 1980 abolishes statutory recognition procedures; extends 
grounds to refuse to join a union; limits picketing and secondary industrial 
action, dismantling of the extension mechanism.





























































































1982 Employment Act of 1982 prohibits actions that force contracts with union 
employers; weakens closed shop; removes some union immunities.
1983 Equal Pay act strengthened.
1984 Trade Union Act of 1984 requires pre-strike ballots, ballots for union elec­
tions and for unions to hold political funds, strengthens employer power to 
get injunctions.
1985 Increase in the employment duration required to benefit from unfair dismissal 
protection (2 years instead of 1 year).
1986 Scope and function of Wages Councils reduced.
1986 onwards ..Restart Program": Mandatory counseling between labor office and unem­
ployed after six months of unemployment. Unemployed has to prove own ef­
forts to get a new job.
1988 Employment Act of 1988 removes further union immunities; extends indi­
vidual rights to work against a union.
1990 Employment Act completes effective abolition of closed shop and protection 
for secondary action. Allows for selective dismissal of unofficial strikers.
1993 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act. Wages Councils abolished 
(except Agriculture).
1995 Extension of employment protection rules to part-time workers.
1996 Reduced duration of unemployment insurance benefits from 1 year to 6 
months.
Source: France: Saint-Paul, 1996; Germany: Sachverstândigenrat, various annual reports;
Netherlands: Hartog, 1997; United Kingdom: Barrell 1994, Nickell, 1997, 





























































































Self-Equilibration in the Labor Market
Two important characteristics of the equilibrating function of the labor market are 
how labor demand reacts to the real wage (employment response to the wage rate 
or wage elasticity of labor demand) and how the wage rate reacts to 
unemployment (wage response to unemployment or unemployment elasticity of 
the wage rate). The wage elasticity of employment indicates how effective wage 
restraint is in bringing about new jobs whereas the unemployment elasticity of the 
wage rate denotes to what extent workers and trade unions are prepared to 
exercise wage restraint in the case of unemployment.
The long-run wage elasticity of labor demand in the private sector, i.e., how the 
labor demand of firms reacts to wages, seems to be similar between European 
countries and the U.S. their long-run wage elasticity both being roughly —1. A one 
percent reduction in labor costs tends to increase labor demand in the private 
sector by 1 percent (OECD 1994a, Table 5.1).l However, the adjustment in 
employment speed of changes in employment to changes in the wage rate, i.e. the 
short-run response, exhibits significant differences. In the U.S., half of the 
adjustment in employment takes place within a single year, European countries 
like Germany or France need two years for half of the adjustment.
How the wage responds to unemployment, i.e., to the disequilibrium pressure in 
the labor market, also differs markedly between countries. This elasticity, a 
measure for the institutional characteristics of labor markets, is a mirror image of 
the quantity adjustment in the labor market. In the U.S. and the U.K., half of the 
wage adjustment takes place in one year; it is therefore not surprising that both 
countries show a relatively low long-term response with an elasticity of -1.0. 
Some European countries need a longer time, for instance, 4 years in Germany 
for half of the wage adjustment; they tend to have a higher long-term response, 
with an elasticity of -3.0 for Germany and -3.5 for France (OECD 1994a, Table 
5.2). This indicates that in some European countries the institutional 
characteristics of the labor market do not a allow a quick correction of a 
disequilibrium via a market clearing price for labor.
The Institutional Characteristics of Bargaining
Whereas wage formation in the United States comes close to being a market 
process (being decentralized, with low unionization, low coverage rates, and low 
coordination), wage negotiations in European countries exhibit characteristics that 





























































































not determined on the firm level but on the industry level or even at the economy 
level. In some countries, results obtained in industry negotiations are extended by 
covert bargaining coordination to other sectors of the economy (Austria, 
Germany) or even by overt bargaining coordination to the economy as a whole 
(Finland, Sweden up to the nineties, Belgium, Spain, Portugal).
Relatively high unionization rates in European countries stress the importance of 
the collective nature of the bargaining process; of course, their impact depends on 
the strength of employer associations, i.e., the level of membership. In one group 
of European countries, high unionization rates are associated with high coverage 
rates (Finland, Norway, Sweden); this contrasts markedly to the US which has 
low unionization and low coverage rates. Interestingly, in quite a few European 
countries, coverage rates exceed unionization rates markedly, for instance, in 
Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain; France has a coverage rate of 92 and a 
unionization rate of 10 (OECD 1994, Chart 5.1, OECD 1995a). In this group of 
countries, legal rules, for instance, minimum wages (France) provide unions with 
leverage over wages. Geimany has a high coverage rate in public services and in 
industry; unions have a leverage on wages by implicit extension and to some 
extent by mandatory expansion of bargained wage in some labor-intensive 
sectors.
Ceteris paribus, a more centralized form of bargaining, high unionization, and 
high coverage rates (strong extension) can be expected to take wage formation 
away from a market solution, but the interplay of these factors and the strength of 
employer associations have to be taken into account as well. If only an increase in 
the degree of centralization of bargaining is considered and variations of other 
aspects of wage formation are not explicitly reviewed, it is not surprising that no 
clear-cut results are obtained. Whereas complete decentralization always goes 
hand in hand with low unemployment, a high degree of centralization (for 
instance, with strong unions and a strong employer associations as in Austria; 
OECD 1994) have been observed to be associated with a positive employment 
picture; it has been argued that in spite of monopoly power unions tend to take 
into account the overall impact of wages on unemployment. Intermediate forms of 
centralization in wage formation have been shown to go together with higher 
unemployment than complete centralization and decentralization for the period 
from the mid-seventies to the mid-eighties; however, the relevance of such a 
hump-shaped curve of the real wage level and the degree of centralization 
(Calmfors and Drifill 1988, Table 2) depends on many different institutional 
characteristics. It is highly questionable whether statistical results will survive if 
data for the nineties are included; for instance, the Nordic countries have now 




























































































theory, centralization hinders the necessary dispersion in the wage structure 
(Calmfors 1993, p. 183).
Empirical analysis confirms that the unemployment rate rises with the coverage of 
collective bargaining (cross-sectional analysis for 20 countries, 1983-88, Layard 
et al. 1991, p. 55; Nickell 1997, Table A3); weak coordination, especially on the 
employers’ side, seems to favor unemployment (ibid.).
It should be noted that the form of wage bargaining has been changing in 
European countries since the mid-eighties. Union coverage has fallen in some 
European countries such as the U.K. and the Netherlands (OECD 1994, Table 
5.8). Extension procedures were dismantled in the United Kingdom in the early 
eighties, whereas France experienced a significant increase in coverage in the 
eighties (OECD 1994). Wage bargaining has become more decentralized in some 
European OECD countries (Lindbeck and Snower 1996, p. 3).
The Tax Wedge
In most European countries, taxes with a negative impact on employment have 
gone up during the seventies and eighties. Taxes influence the demanu for and the 
supply of labor in a number of ways. Employers’ contributions to social security 
raise the real labor costs of firms and are a tax on labor. Employees’ contributions 
to social security as well as income taxes widen the tax wedge between labor 
costs for firms (producers’ wage) and net income for workers (consumption 
wage). The net income defines the incentives for work; it influences the 
willingness for wage restraint and the bargaining behavior of trade unions.
The overall marginal tax wedge including employers’ and employees’ social 
security contributions has increased since the seventies in most European OECD 
countries (OECD 1994a, Table 9.1), a main reason being that the level of social 
insurance was extended. For instance, in Germany, social security contributions 
for unemployment, retirement, health, and nursing insurance increased from 26.5 
(1970) to 40.9 (1996) percent of the gross wage. This means a wider tax wedge 
between producers’ and consumption wage. Assuming a given increase in labor 
productivity, higher social security contributions leave less room for increases in 
the net wage. Insofar as the contributions are borne by firms (and the net claims 
of workers do not adjust downward), the increase in social security contributions 
weakens the demand for labor in the long run and adds to unemployment.
The response of total labor costs to an increase of employers’ social security 
contributions is different between countries. In some countries such as Germany, 




























































































implies that adjustment is eventually taking place in terms of employment and 
unemployment. In other countries, such as the United States, wages adjust 
downward so that total labor cost remain unchanged (OECD 1994a, Table 9.5). 
This apparendy reflects different institutional properties of wage setting behavior. 
Quite clearly, where employers’ social security contributions end up in an 
increase in total labor costs, unemployment will rise in the long run (OECD 
1994a, Chart 9.4).
The implicit taxation of labor demand is relatively heavy in some European 
countries. Whereas employers bear a smaller share relative to employees in the 
Netherlands (7.9/33.5) and an equal share in Germany (20.45/20.45), other 
countries require a much higher contribution from firms such as France 
(33.5/18.6) and Italy (46.1/10.0; OECD 1996a, Table 17). Spain also has high 
employers contributions (OECD 1994a, Chart 9.7). We should expect that 
demand for labor is more severely affected in these countries.
4. The Legal Environment
In the sixties and in the seventies, job protection legislation was passed in most 
European countries that regulated the procedures that had to be followed in the 
case of dismissals. In general, dismissals had to be approved by work councils; 
social aspects (marital status, number of children, health) played a role in 
dismissals. Severance pay became mandatory; in some countries like Germany 
“social closing plans” had to be established in the case of major restructuring of 
firms (OECD 1993, Table 3.7 and 3.8). The legal norms were further developed 
by the labor courts.
The intent of this complex legislation was to make jobs more “secure”. 
Unfortunately, this type of legislation only looked at the first-order effect in a 
very static sense but neglected the long-term impact on the demand for labor. 
Indeed, those who had a job were protected; but for firms, job protection rules 
make dismissals costly. In an intertemporal profit-maximizing calculus, layoff 
constraints put a negative shadow price on labor thus reducing the demand for 
labor in the long run (Van Long and Siebert 1983) (whereas also the ambiguous 
role of layoff costs is stressed, Bertola 1990). Of course, it took some time, 
before firms fully experienced these restraints, but eventually it became clear to 
them that in the case of a crisis, of an unfavorable development of the sector or of 
the economy, higher adjustment for labor costs arose. Firms anticipated these 





























































































Layoff constraints are a telling example that under the institutional conditions of 
Europe the cumulative effects of regulations self-enforce their long-run negative 
impact. The negative shadow price on labor due to layoff restraints would be 
lower if, in the case of an economic crisis, firms could adjust wages or working 
hours downward. Wages are sticky downward and flexibility with respect to 
working hours is only developing in the nineties. Therefore, firms were strongly 
induced to anticipate the layoff restraints in their hiring.
Job protection rules can be considered to be at the core of the continental policy 
towards the unemployment problem: the approach to protect those who have a 
job in the short run reduces the incentives to create new jobs in the long run.
Political decision making with respect to rules for the labor market today still 
shows a short-term orientation of a similar nature: in most continental countries, 
the use of temporary work contracts is legally restricted, overtime rules reduce 
flexibility with respect to working time, and product market regulations have a 
negative impact on the labor market.
Empirical studies indicate that job security legislation (including severance pay) is 
positively correlated with the unemployment rate. In a pooled time-series 
estimation for 19 OECD countries, job security is found to be positively 
associated with long-term unemployment (OECD 1993, p. 105).
5. The Reservation Wage in the Welfare State
The rise of the welfare state in Europe took place in the seventies. Redistribu­
tional targets played a major role, and not seldom were institutional arrangements 
of the labor market changed by politicians to foster political support. This 
changed the incentive system of the labor market.
The Exogenous Increase in the Reservation Wage
The typical European economy has two different layers of income floors for 
people who cannot earn their living in the labor market. One layer is social 
welfare benefits. Originally intended to protect those who are old (and have 
insufficient pensions) and those who are physically unable to work, welfare 
benefits now also cover some who may be able to work. Welfare benefits are 
provided for an unlimited period of time and are supposed to cover the 
subsistence level; they are means-tested and not linked to previous income. 
Guaranteed income benefits that are provided irrespective of work history have 




























































































Finland (1972), and France (1989; OECD 1994a, Table 8.6). In some countries, 
guaranteed income benefits have gone up considerably, changing the relative 
incentive for work and nonwork. For instance, in Germany, social security 
benefits for an employee (married, one child) increased from 65.7 percent (1970) 
to 85 percent (1994) of the net wage income of the lowest-paid job in industry 
(Siebert 1995, Table 8.3).
The other layer of the income floor is unemployment benefits that are usually 
limited and linked to previous work income. Net replacement rates, i.e., the ratio 
of unemployment benefits to the previous wage income after tax, reached 70 
percent in the European OECD countries in 1994 against 60 percent in the OECD 
average for a couple with no children (OECD 1996, Table 2.1); they are meant to 
be higher than income from welfare. Some countries have additional intermediate 
forms of support, for instance, Arbeitslosenhilfe in Germany which is paid after 
Arbeitslosengeld is terminated and is generally provided indefinitely. In the 
seventies and eighties, in general, entitlements were raised in the European 
countries. The OECD index of benefit entitlements (OECD 1996, Chart 2.2) 
increased markedly already in the sixties for the Netherlands and Belgium and 
thereafter for all the other European countries (except for Germany where it 
remained relatively stable and the U.K., where it fell in the eighties).
Some countries increased the duration of unemployment benefits (OECD 1994a, 
Chart 8.1), access to unemployment benefits was made easier in general, and 
social security benefits were given more graciously. In addition, other policy 
measures affected the incentive structure relevant for the labor market; for 
instance, the legal minimum wage was raised in the Netherlands (in the seventies) 
and in France in the seventies and eighties (OECD 1994a, Chart 5.14).2
The Impact o f a Higher Reservation Wage
Taking all these measures together means that on the whole the reservation wage 
was raised in the seventies and eighties. This has had several effects.
First, the unemployed have a lower incentive to accept work at a low market 
wage rate. In addition, their search intensity for a new job is lower. The 
institutional feature of a higher reservation wage holds people in unemployment, 
thus establishing an unemployment trap and impairing the market clearing role of 
wages.
The reduced incentive to work resulting from government sponsored income in 
the case of no work is aggravated by high effective marginal tax rates (reaching 




























































































benefits to market income. This discourages effort and establishes a poverty trap. 
In addition, with the sanctionary of social assistance providing full health and 
disability insurance besides some income, work effort is directed towards the 
black market.
How incentives operate is nicely illustrated by the experience of the Netherlands 
with respect to unemployment and disability benefits. Whereas unemployment 
benefits are reduced to the social minimum after some time, prior to 1993 
disability benefits were not reduced, but instead were indexed to the price level. 
Thus, it was more favorable to claim disability rather than unemployment 
benefits, and the Netherlands observed an explosion in disability benefit 
recipients.
Second, trade unions (and insiders) are less prepared to take into consideration 
the opportunity costs that wage increases surpassing productivity growth have on 
unemployment; in wage negotiations, trade unions pay attention to the level of 
unemployment, however, only to some extent and only with a time lag. If those 
who are or become unemployed are more or less protected by governmental 
schemes, trade unions have a reduced incentive to consider what sort of impact 
wage rises will have on unemployment. In a way, the wage cartel shifts the 
burden of its behavior to a third party, namely to the government or to the 
taxpayer. Moreover, the bargaining power of insiders is unintentionally increased 
if outsiders are taken care of by the government; the outside option of insiders is 
improved. With an expansion of the welfare state, the assignment of 
responsibilities of different players of economic policies is reshuffled: Whereas in 
the regular assignment, wage policy is responsible for employment, fiscal policy 
for growth and redistribution, and monetary policy for price level stability, the 
rise of the welfare state shifts the responsibility for employment away from the 
players in wage setting to fiscal and social policy, i.e. to the government.
Econometric studies show that in a number of European OECD countries, wage 
negotiations respond to social policies. Empirical evidence for the impact of 
benefit duration and replacement rates on unemployment is found in a cross- 
section analysis of 20 countries in the period 1983-88 by Layard et al. (1991 p. 
55). Both factors raise the unemployment rate. This is also confirmed by time 
series analysis (Layard et al. p. 433). Layard et al. conclude from their empirical 
work that economies respond well to exogenous shocks if they have an 
unemployment benefit system which discourages long-term unemployment, i.e., if 
the system offers benefits for a short duration (15 month or less). A pooled time- 
series estimation for 19 OECD countries finds a positive impact of the duration of 
benefits on long-term-unemployment (OECD 1993, p. 106). Several studies 




























































































reducing it by increasing the labor supply and by wage competition, OECD 1993, 
p. 50).
Empirical studies for the U.S. indicate that an increase in potential benefits of one 
week is associated with an increase in the mean spell of unemployment of 
between 0.16 and 0.2 weeks (Katz and Meyer 1990); the U.S. exit rate from 
unemployment falls monotonously over time and jumps upward at the point 
where benefits are exhausted (Katz and Meyer 1990). The length of the benefit 
periods seems to have a greater impact on the exit rate from unemployment than 
the benefit level.
The OECD concludes (1994a, p. 213):
“There is considerable evidence that benefits affect unemployment rates. Countries 
which currently have high unemployment and significantly reduce benefit disincentives 
may experience a considerable improvement in their unemployment situation within a 
few years; and conversely, countries with high entitlements which do not reduce them 
may find that other policies alone are not enough. In the long term, if unemployment is 
to be kept low, it is vital to limit entitlements to benefit and refuse benefit to people 
who are not available for work, and give employers and local governments incentives to 
tackle employment problems.”
Third, the reservation wage defines the floor of the wage structure. With an 
increase of the reservation wage, the floor of the wage structure moves upward 
and the earnings distribution is truncated from below. This is to the detriment of 
low-skilled workers; they are priced out of the market. The institutional features 
pushing up the reservation wage are the cause of unemployment of low-skilled 
persons. This is especially relevant when labor demand goes against the less 
qualified (Nickell 1997).
Minimum wages set by law affect the level of unemployment in European 
countries as soon as they approach the market clearing wage in the lower 
segments. Whereas the legal minimum wage is 34 percent of the median earnings 
in the U.S., it reaches 60 percent in France (OECD 1996, p. 71). European 
Countries with an explicit minimum wage that is applied economy -wide are 
characterized by high unemployment rates (Belgium, France, Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, with the exception of the Netherlands; Jackman 1995, Table 7). In France, 
Spain, Portugal, and Greece, i.e., in the French-Mediterranean group of countries, 
the minimum wage applying to 18-year-old workers is one major reason for the 
high youth unemployment rate.
Note that the disincentives engendered by the two layers of the income floor also 




























































































aggravate Europe’s labor market problems; this is especially true if it is taken into 
consideration that over time a negative income tax would affect the behavior of 
the young generation (Siebert 1995).
Wage Differentiation
The impact of institutional arrangements is clearly seen with respect to wage 
differentiation. Centralization of wage formation, covert or overt coordination, 
and extension tend to lead to less wage differentiation; one result is that the lower 
segments of the wage structure are raised relatively more for equity reasons. A 
higher reservation wage due to a generous welfare state enforces this tendency. A 
low degree of wage differentiation indicates that the wage rates do not fully fulfill 
their function in bringing about the necessary adjustments to a new equilibrium 
with more employment; then, as a substitute for prices, adjustments take place via 
quantities, i.e., via changes in employment. This is especially relevant in an 
environment of intensive structural change in the foreign trade-oriented 
economies of Europe. In addition, work is now reorganized around small, 
customer oriented teams; this requires a more differentiated wage structure 
(Lindbeck and Snower 1996).
The most striking fact is that in the eighties and nineties relative wages have 
become more differentiated in the U.S. and the U.K., while they have remained 
unchanged in some European countries. Relative wages, or earning dispersions 
can be measured by taking the ratio of various earnings deciles to one another. 
For example, the ninth decile refers to the upper earnings Emit that ninety percent 
of all employees earn less than. In this way, the fifth decile defines the median 
earning level. One way of measuring earnings dispersion is therefore to take the 
ratio of the ninth decile to the median or to take the ratio of the ninth decile to the 
first decile. According to this measure, a trend of increased differentiation can be 
observed during the eighties and nineties for the U.S. and the U.K. (OECD 1996, 
Table 3.1). Although sensitive to the recession of 1991 in the U.S. (as can be 
expected, since the low-skilled are likely to be laid off first, which means less 
earnings dispersion), dispersion increases immediately after the recession; in the 
U.K., it is unaffected by the recession.
Some European countries are characterized by a reduction in dispersion 
(Germany in the eighties and nineties, Belgium in the mid-eighties to nineties), 
some by a stable dispersion (Netherlands) or by near-stability (France, with a 
greater dispersion in the upper deciles of the distribution), and some by a small 
increase in dispersion without a consistent trend for male or female employees 




























































































Economic theory would tell us that ceteris paribus a country with a relatively low 
wage dispersion can be expected to have a low percentage of employment in low- 
paid jobs. This is exactly what can be observed. Defining low-paid workers as 
those who earn less than two-thirds of the median wage, the percentage of low- 
paid workers in total employment varies noticeably with the dispersion of 
earnings, from 5.2 percent in Sweden to 25 percent in the U.S. (Belgium 7.2, 
Netherlands 11.9, Italy 12.5, Germany 13.3, France 13.3, United Kingdom 19.6; 
OECD 1996, Table 3.2). It can be shown that the incidence of low pay varies 
inversely with unemployment benefit replacement rates (OECD 1996, Table 3.3).
Note that the inequality in dispersion of earnings observed in a single year need 
not be permanent; it changes over time because of vertical mobility. Within a 
five-year period, the patterns of vertical mobility in the OECD countries do not 
appear to be too different from one another (OECD 1996, p. 94): approximately 
half of the workers move up one or more quintiles over a five-year period. It 
seems that two-thirds of the inequality still persist after a five-year period. A 
longer time horizon appeals to be associated with a strong vertical mobility in the 
U.S. (Addison 1996). For low-paid workers below 65 percent of median earnings 
(who show a different frequency in OECD countries), however, vertical mobility 
varies, considerably between OECD countries. More than half of them are in a 
higher earning status after five years in Italy (69.8 percent), Denmark (68.3 
percent), the United Kingdom (52.9) and France (50.2) in contrast to Germany 
(44) and the U.S. (26.9). In some countries, a large proportion leaves full 
employment (Germany, 40.5; U.S. 39.2). In general, a low share of low-paid 
workers seems to be associated with a high vertical mobility (OECD 1996, Table 
3.9).
Additional clues for the relevance of earning dispersions may be obtained if 
qualifications, regional dimensions, and sectorial aspects are taken into 
consideration. Especially with respect to qualifications, for instance, those of 
nonmanual and manual workers, wage differentiation in the U.S. has increased 
and is high relative to Europe. In some European countries, this type of wage 
differentiation has been reduced in the eighties (for France see Katz et al., 1995, 
Table 1.3) or remained constant (Freeman and Katz 1993, Table 2.1). It is hard to 
conceive that the European labor force is so much more homogeneous with 
respect to qualifications than the U.S. labor force that no wage differentiation is 
necessary. This is also contradicted by the fact that a large portion of the 
unemployed in Europe consists of the low-skilled.
Another aspect of wage differentiation is the regional wage structure. Under 
market conditions, one should expect the regional wage structure to react to 




























































































regions relative to others, the dispersion in the regional wage structure should 
increase. This should be especially true for Europe where the regional mobility of 
people is relatively low. For the period 1975-1990, Germany shows a different 
picture. Whereas the unemployment rates of West German Lander became more 
diverse, the regional wage structure remained constant (Siebert 1995, Table 7.1).
Sectorial wage structures may be more difficult to measure and to compare. Some 
empirical estimates indicate that sectorial wage differentiation is high and 
increasing in the U.S. whereas it is stable or moderately declining in most 
European countries (Freeman 1988, Table 2; Davis 1992; OECD 1995a, Table 
1. 11).
The Dual Labor Market
Taken together, the phenomena described so far have led to a dual labor market 
in most European countries. There is a sizable section of the labor force for which 
the labor market does not function anymore. Labor-saving technical progress and 
structural change due to intensified competition in a more globalized world 
economy would require flexibility in wages which is prevented by institutional 
conditions. Unemployment is reinforced by ratchet effects in that it becomes more 
and more difficult to find employment again when one has been out of 
employment for a while. The unemployed lose qualifications relative to the 
employed, in severe cases they also lose their social competence. Unemployment 
can easily become persistent, and in order to overcome the hysteresis and path 
dependency of unemployment in a self-enforcing trap, it takes a big and a 




























































































6. The Scandinavian, French-Mediterranean, German, and British-Dutch 
Models: Four Different Approaches
Although Europe often looks like a homogenous block from the outside, marked 
differences in the institutional approaches of individual countries have developed 
in the eighties and nineties. It can be shown that their performance in the labor 
market is sensitive to these changes.
Four different performance groups may be distinguished (for a similar, but slightly 
different view see Paque 1996): (i) The Scandinavian countries (except 
Denmark), challenged with a dramatic increase in unemployment after 1989, are 
successfully attempting to restructure the welfare state, (ii) The French- 
Mediterranean countries (except Portugal), which experienced a steady upward 
movement of the unemployment rate up to the mid-nineties (and increasing as 
well as high long-term unemployment), have not succeeded in improving the 
functioning of their labor markets. For instance, in France, society seems to be 
unwilling to accept a comprehensive reform (Saint-Paul 1996); the failed revision 
of minimum wages for young workers during the Balladur government is a 
striking example, (iii) Germany which had a hefty increase in unemployment in 
the seventies and early eighties in the western part of the country and 
transformation unemployment in eastern Germany after unification, is 
characterized by very persistent unemployment. Long-term unemployment 
remains high. So far in the nineties, only minor institutional reforms have been 
undertaken, (iv) The Netherlands and the U.K. took a new approach to the labor 
market which resulted in a reduction in the unemployment rate in the eighties, 
most notably in the Netherlands. Long-term unemployment has also been 
reduced.
Other countries cannot easily be classified into one of these four groups. Austria 
follows the French pattern, Denmark lies between the French and German 
patterns, and Belgium exhibits the French patterns if the Belgian definition of the 
unemployment rate is used, but exhibits the Dutch patterns if the standardized 
OECD-rates are used.
Since the mid-eighties, the Netherlands, besides implementing wage restraints 
(causing a fall in the real labor cost per unit of output), restructured the welfare 
state. Replacement rates for unemployment, sickness, and disability were 
lowered, access to benefits was more thoroughly scrutinized, employer 
contributions to health insurance were related to the sickness record of the firm, 





























































































In the U.K., wage formation moved more towards a decentralized market 
process. Legislation reduced the power of trade unions, membership declined. 
Labor markets were made somewhat more flexible (Nickell 1997); wage 
bargaining became less coordinated. Wage Councils were eliminated, and 
employment protection legislation was weakened. Benefit replacement rates 
declined and the benefit system was tightened. There was also a switch away 
from payroll taxes towards commodity taxes. Earnings dispersion has increased 
since the mid-eighties. The unemployment rate has fallen since the mid-eighties 
but it still remains high, and possibly higher than one would have expected after 
all the institutional changes.3
Conclusions
The majority of European countries have followed a policy of making only 
marginal changes to their labor market institutions in the nineties. On average, 
they did not succeed in reducing unemployment noticeably; in most countries it is 
still rising, for instance, in Germany and France. The Dutch-British experience 
suggests that more comprehensive institutional changes can improve the 
functioning of the labor market and create more employment. It seems fair to 
conclude that the specter of unemployment cannot be banned out of Europe 
unless governments are prepared to undertake major reforms of the institutional 
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1 For Germany, a lower elasticity of 0.73 has been estimated in other studies; still other 
studies find an even lower elasticity (OECD 1995a, Table 2.5).
?  Note that the Netherlands reduced the role of the minimum wage in 1983 (OECD 1993, p. 
167).
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